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    There are some difficulties in the notion of sets, in particular, infinite sets. 
Among the most serious difficulties is the question about how we can make a 
general statement about an infinite set. Because there are infinitely many members, 
we can not do it by checking all the members of it. 
    Carnap distinguished two kinds of generalities, one of which is what he 
called ‘numerical generality’, and the other ‘specific generality’. The former is a 
property which all the members of a set actually have in common, while the latter 
is one which can be deduced logically from some general property of a set. He 
contended that a general property of an infinite set must be specific generality. So, 
he concluded, the general statement about an infinite set is nothing but a statement 
logically deduced from some statement which is already known to be true for the 
set. 
    It is immediately clear that his explanation is not sufficient, for it is difficult 
to determine what property is specifically general. Moreover, since specific 
generality is something deduced from another generality, there must be, in the first 
place, at least one generality known to us which is neither numerical nor specific. 
    Another question will arise. How can we know a set to be infinite. 
Illustrating this, I refer to three examples. They are infinite sets given by 
Dedekind, Zermelo, and Peano. I show that they have a common structure, 
namely the structure of recursiveness. We can construe these sets as sets of objects 
which are produced by an endless and recursive procedure. It is this recursive and 
endless procedure that enable us to reach the notion of infinity. 
    These things considered, I conclude that as regards infinite sets, there is a 
generality which I shall call ‘conventional generality’ given by rules. And this 
means that infinite sets are artificial, consequently not real objects, in some sense. 
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